Dr Sean P. Roberts, a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Winchester, and Dr Ulrike Ziemer , Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Winchester, look at the stress the invasion of Ukraine is putting on Russia’s relations with its regional partners.
On 7 September 2024, and with the backdrop of war in Ukraine, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)—Russia’s equivalent of NATO—began military exercises in Kyrgyzstan. While showcasing Russia’s regional leadership, these exercises also raise questions about the state of relations with close partners, in particular as Armenia—a long-standing CSTO member—refused to participate. Overall, the Ukraine conflict has far-reaching implications for Russia’s regional leadership role; a role steadily rebuilt since 1991. As argued below, conflict in Ukraine presents Russia’s regional allies with a certain cost-benefit dilemma, while reigniting older fears surrounding Moscow’s intentions.
Russian-led Eurasia refers to the group of post-Soviet states that have coalesced around Russia following the collapse of the USSR. These states are most readily seen through regional organisations, such as the CSTO, but also the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), launched in 2015 as an ambitious EU-style trading bloc. Russia dominates these organisations through a form of consensual hegemony, providing member states with certain benefits in return for loyalty. Today, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan enjoy overlapping membership in both the CSTO and EAEU, constituting the core of Russian-led Eurasia, sharing a common history (Soviet), culture, and language (Russian).
Given these common attributes, it is perhaps not surprising that loyalty to Moscow has been evident throughout the Ukraine conflict. While the international community has largely condemned Russia’s war of aggression, Russia’s regional partners have offered tacit political support. UN voting records show Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan consistently abstaining or voting with Russia on key Ukraine resolutions. In July 2024, for example, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding the return of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power plant to Ukrainian authorities. Belarus voted against this resolution, while Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan abstained. This pattern can be seen with all UN resolutions relating to Ukraine, including both the February 2022 invasion and the March 2014 annexation of Crimea.
In addition to political support, Russia’s close partners have (controversially) provided economic support. There have been persistent reports that EAEU member states are helping Russia by-pass economic sanctions. In 2022, an estimated US$1 billion in EU exports destined for Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan disappeared in transit through Russia. By 2024, there were claims that Kyrgyz and Kazakh companies were aiding the war effort by supplying electronic components and even drones used by the Russian military in Ukraine.
The explanation for this support is logical when viewed from the perspective of security and economic dependence on Russia. In January 2022, for example, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian-led CSTO authorised its first ever deployment, sending troops to Kazakhstan in support of embattled president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in the face of civil unrest. Moscow’s ability to provide but also withhold support to ruling groups is a key calculation underpinning regional support.
In the economic sphere, access to the huge Russian market of over 140 million people offers tangible incentives to partners. This includes access to supply chains, infrastructure, and the Russian labour market. To put this in perspective, in 2021, remittances from workers in Russia accounted for 30 percent of Kyrgyz GDP. This access also extends to energy supply, where EAEU member states enjoy gas prices (according to Russian sources) 10 times lower than for EU member states. Loyalty to Russia has concrete economic advantages that go some way in explaining the leader-follower dynamic.
Despite the tangible benefits of aligning with Russia, the process of re-building Russian-led Eurasia has been difficult. For each step, Russia has needed to assure partner states that the pronounced power asymmetry between them (measured in terms of state size, and economic and military potential) poses no threat, meaning partners need to view Russian hegemony as benign; an enhancement rather than detriment to their sovereignty.
What is clear is that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed the calculus. At the surface level, the EU and US have repeatedly threatened to extend economic sanctions to include those helping Russia. Indeed, in June 2024, Kazakh and Kyrgyz companies were included in over 300 fresh economic sanctions announced by the US Treasury Department.
However, at a deeper level, there is evidence that Russia’s partners—never completely sure of Russia’s intentions—are reassessing their relations. In short, Russia’s readiness to dismember Ukraine has set a precedent. Kazakhstan, for example, like Ukraine, has a large ethnic Russian population, and Russian leaders (as for Ukraine) have publicly questioned the legitimacy of Kazakh statehood.
There is also the problem of coordination. Both the CSTO and EAEU continue to draw criticism from members over Russia’s readiness to ignore commitments. In June 2024, for example, Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan announced that his country would leave the CSTO. While this is a rare public challenge to Russia’s authority, Pashinyan has repeatedly criticised Moscow over its lack of support in Armenia’s ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan.
Likewise, EAEU member states have voiced frustration at Moscow’s lack of consultation in key economic decisions. In 2014, Russia imposed counter sanctions on European states without consulting partners. This was also accompanied by a significant currency devaluation that forced both Belarus and Kazakhstan to follow suit. In March 2022, the Russian government imposed a snap ban on the export of wheat (among other food stuffs), forcing panic buying in Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and creating a serious economic as well as food security impact.
Any close analysis of relations between Russia and regional partners reveals long-standing coordination problems, underpinned by a deep-seated lack of trust. In this sense, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine has simply reignited older fears. It is therefore unsurprising that Russia’s partners are actively using the few levers at their disposal to balance Russian influence.
In terms of internal balancing, some states have attempted to weaken the influence of Russian language, and thus Moscow’s information dominance. In June 2024, Kazakhstan passed a media law prioritising Kazakh language over Russian for public information purposes. This follows ongoing attempts to transition the Kazakh alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin. In 2023, similar moves in Kyrgyzstan aimed at reducing the influence of Russian were labelled “discriminatory” by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
In terms of external balancing or building relations with third states to counter Russian influence, there is less room to manoeuvre. In recent years, Russia has pressured partners to limit bilateral relations with both the EU and US. But this has not stopped Russia’s allies from promoting relations with other regional powers.
Kazakhstan, for one, has actively promoted the expansion of the EAEU as part of a “Greater Eurasia,” including deeper cooperation with China’s Belt-Road Initiative and an enhanced regional role for India. In July 2024, Belarus joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)—a China-led regional security bloc, that includes Russia, India, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While this move strengthens Belarus sovereignty in the face of pressure along its Ukraine-NATO borders, it also represents a rare move by Belarus to mitigate Russian influence that has grown inexorably following the invasion of Ukraine.
In the final analysis, the future of Russia’s regional leadership is dependent on the outcome of the Ukraine war, but also the ability of Russia’s partners to “nest” Russian-led Eurasia within wider regional initiatives and “open up” the leadership space.